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Abstract 
The ability of households to insure consumption from adverse shocks is an important 
aspect of vulnerability to poverty. How is consumption insurance achieved in a low-income 
setting where formal credit and insurance markets have been observed to be imperfect or 
missing? Using 2003 data from the Philippine province of Bukidnon, we investigate how 
labor supply is used to buffer transitory income shocks, in light of credit constraints. We find 
that the most vulnerable households are those with little education and with few or no able-
bodied male members. Appropriate policy responses include counter-cyclical workfare 
programs targeted to households with high female-to-male ratios, households with high 
dependency ratios, and households with little or no education, as well as the provision of 
universal education and health care. These programs are likely to be effective in 
strengthening the labor endowments of households and improving their ability to cope with 
adverse shocks in the future. 
Keywords: labor supply, credit constraints, consumption smoothing, coping strategies, 
idiosyncratic shocks, Philippines 
JEL codes: J22 (Time allocation and labor supply), J43 (Agricultural labor markets)  
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1. Introduction 
The ability of families to cope with adverse shocks such as crop failure, 
unemployment, or illness is an important aspect of vulnerability to poverty. The increasing 
attention on risk and vulnerability arises from mounting evidence that shocks inflict 
permanent effects on human capital formation, nutrition and incomes. The existence of 
poverty traps and other forms of persistence has shown that vulnerability to poverty is in 
itself a source of deprivation. (Dercon 2001) 
Well-being and poverty are the outcomes of a complex decision process of 
households and individuals given assets and incomes, and faced with risk. On the other 
hand, vulnerability is an ex ante concept, determined by the options available to the 
households and individuals to make a living, the risks they face, and their ability to handle 
these risks (Dercon 2001). The ultimate effect of risk on the well-being of households and 
individuals depends largely on the coping strategies that may be employed by the household 
to protect consumption when adverse shocks occur. 
How is consumption insurance achieved in a low-income setting where formal credit 
and insurance markets have been observed to be imperfect or missing? As noted by Kochar 
(1999), it is widely believed that consumption insurance is achieved through asset 
transactions, i.e. saving and dissaving. However, there are a variety of formal and informal 
mechanisms households may employ to insure consumption from fluctuations in income. 
These risk-management strategies include: community risk-sharing (e.g. reciprocal 
arrangements, state-contingent remittances), income diversification, adoption of low-return 
low-risk crop and asset portfolios, savings depletion, sale of assets, borrowing, and ex post 
labor supply adjustments, among others.  
Because labor is often the only asset of the poor, this study attempts to measure the 
extent to which farm households use labor supplied to off-farm work in the face of adverse 
shocks and binding credit constraints. Moreover, this study investigates how this labor 
supply response differs between women and men, and on the labor participation of school-
age children. While previous research has concentrated on the ‘added worker effect’ of 
wives to augment household income when their husbands become unemployed, this role 
need not be confined to married women. In fact, the Filipino norm of maintaining large 
households may be viewed as a risk-sharing arrangement, where secondary earners, adults 
and children, may be called upon to participate in the labor market to maintain household 
income when faced with a negative shock to household income.  
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This research differs from past studies in its explicit attention to both labor decisions 
and credit constraints.
1 Intuitively, the smoothing role of the secondary earners’ labor supply 
should be more important for the case of poorer households who cannot rely on asset 
depletion or borrowing to cope with the shock. The absence of a redistributive system of 
taxes or transfers, as well as the underdevelopment of insurance and credit markets also 
contribute to the importance of secondary earners as the primary household coping 
mechanism. Over the long run, the effects of adjustment costs to certain household 
members may erode the ability of the household to cope with future shocks, as is the case 
for example when children sacrifice schooling for work.  
Household responses at the micro level also translate to macro trends in 
employment, education and health outcomes, especially when shocks are aggregate in 
nature (e.g. economic crises and the like). The increasing volatility in world markets likewise 
increases the frequency and severity of aggregate shocks faced by ordinary households. A 
deeper understanding of how adjustment costs are borne within the household can inform 
social protection policy on where interventions are most necessary. 
In his analysis of the effect of the East Asian crisis on the employment of women and 
men in the Philippines, Lim (2000) finds that women have higher labor force participation 
rates and longer working hours relative to men during the crisis. During this period, he also 
notes that high school enrollment rates declined for both males and females, whereas 
elementary enrollment declined for females but not for males. Lim (2000) concludes that in 
crisis times, and specifically in the East Asian crisis, there was a tendency toward 
“overworked” females and “underworked” males. He notes that maintaining and increasing 
labor market participation of females not previously in the work force appeared to be an 
important coping mechanism in the Philippines. 
The objective of this paper is to analyze whether women and men increase their 
market labor supply in response to adverse shocks and in light of credit constraints. In 
particular, we attempt to answer the following questions:  Controlling for the effect of binding 
credit constraints, do women and men work more days off-farm when faced with adverse 
shocks? 
                                                 
1 In the labor literature, the increase in household labor supply as a response to fluctuations in 
household income (e.g. unemployment of the breadwinner, crop failure) is referred to as the ‘added 
worker effect’. Because the presence of credit constraints limits the set of coping strategies available 
to households, the ‘added worker effect’ is expected to be stronger when households are unable to 
borrow to maintain consumption (Cullen and Gruber 1996; Lundberg 1985; Mincer 1962). Labor 
supply was seldom studied explicitly within the context of credit constraints, with the exception of 
García-Escribano (2003).  
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Our analysis uses the 2003 data from Bukidnon, Philippines, collected by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Research Institute for Mindanao 
Culture (RIMCU), which allows us to investigate these issues using two sets of households: 
(i) ‘original’ households, who are demographically older and correspond to the same 
households surveyed two decades ago in 1984-85, and (ii) ‘split’ households, who are 
children of original households that are now grown up and have established their own 
households. Comparing our findings for these two groups also allows us to investigate how 
labor supply responses to adverse shocks differ at earlier versus later stages of the life 
cycle. 
2.  Review of literature 
This research builds on two separate strands of literature: (i) the consumption 
smoothing literature, and (ii) the literature on the smoothing role of secondary earners. 
2.1 Consumption  smoothing 
The perfect risk-sharing hypothesis implies that, once aggregate shocks are 
accounted for, the growth rate of consumption would be independent of any idiosyncratic 
shock affecting the resources or income available to the household (Cochrane 1991, Deaton 
1991, Townsend 1995, Skoufias and Quisumbing 2002). Thus, the greater the correlation 
between household consumption and income, the less effective the risk-management 
strategy adopted by the household. This approach has also been used to assess the role of 
credit and savings as insurance substitutes, and make inferences on liquidity constraints
2 
(Skoufias and Quisumbing 2002).  
Although empirical work on consumption smoothing has rejected the full risk-sharing 
hypothesis (Cochrane 1991, Townsend 1995), there is evidence that the overall effect of 
idiosyncratic income shocks on household consumption is not large. This implies that some 
mechanisms or channels, including those that in a first best allocation would be considered 
sub-optimal, absorb most of the shocks. (Garcia-Escribano 2003) 
Research on low-income economies (for example, see Morduch 1995) show that 
households use a mix of formal and informal strategies to cope with adverse shocks 
including: community risk-sharing (e.g. reciprocal arrangements, state-contingent 
remittances), income diversification, adoption of low-return low-risk crop and asset portfolios, 
savings depletion, sale of assets, borrowing, and ex post labor supply adjustments, among 
                                                 
2 One key insight in the simulation results of Deaton (1991) is that a credit-constrained household may 
still be able to smooth consumption using precautionary savings, thus remaining consistent with the 
permanent income hypothesis (Skoufias and Quisumbing 2002).  
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others. However, different households may have differential access to these strategies. 
Poorer households in particular may be less able to use strategies that rely on initial wealth 
as collateral (Skoufias and Quisumbing 2002). On the other hand, it is often possible to 
adjust labor supply, regardless of initial wealth. 
As noted by Kochar (1999), past research has demonstrated that farm households in 
developing countries are able to protect consumption from idiosyncratic shocks but offers 
little evidence on how this is achieved. To be able to understand the underlying economic 
environment, it is important to study how and to what extent specific mechanisms isolate 
consumption from the effect of idiosyncratic income shocks. Much of the work on 
consumption smoothing has focused on the contribution of assets in buffering consumption 
variability (Garcia-Escribano 2003, Kochar 1999). However, these studies may not be 
relevant in explaining how consumption insurance is achieved in low-income communities, 
where asset levels may be low and access to credit limited.  
2.2  Smoothing role of secondary earners  
The literature exploring the role of secondary earners in smoothing transitory shocks 
to the household head’s earnings may be divided into two sets. The first set finds evidence 
of an insurance effect of secondary earners to the extent that it crowds out precautionary 
savings (Kochar 1995, 1999, Merrigan and Normadin 1996, Engen and Gruber 2001, Low 
1999). Kochar (1995, 1999) concludes that well-functioning labor markets in Indian villages 
allow households to increase labor income in response to crop shocks, reducing the need to 
resort to asset depletion or borrowing to smooth consumption. Using UK household data, 
Merrigan and Normadin (1996) find that precautionary motives are stronger for households 
with two earners compared to households with a single earner. Similarly, Engen and Gruber 
(2001) find that the effect of an increase in unemployment insurance on wealth holdings is 
smaller for married couples than for singles in the US. Lastly, Low (1999) uses numerical 
methods to show that precautionary savings in households with a secondary earner is 
smaller only if the correlation between shocks to the potential wages of the husband and 
wife is sufficiently negative. 
The second set of literature explores the smoothing role of secondary earners 
through the ‘added worker effect’. The ‘added worker effect’ refers to the temporary increase 
in female labor supply (participation or hours worked) in response to transitory shocks to 
household income (excluding the wife’s income).
3  Most studies estimate female 
employment or female hours worked as a function of the husband’s labor status together 
with standard covariates (e.g. labor market characteristics, household fixed effects). 
                                                 
3 See Malapit (2003) for a review of literature on the ‘added worker effect’.   
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However, some studies have extended the definition of the husband’s (spouse’s) earnings 
loss to account for underemployment (Maloney 1987), idiosyncratic earnings shocks other 
than unemployment (Garcia-Escribano 2002), and health shocks (Coile 2004).  
The presence of liquidity constraints is one of the main arguments put forward in 
support of the existence of the ‘added worker effect’ (Mincer 1962; Lundberg 1985; Cullen 
and Gruber 1996; Finegan and Margo 1994; Garcia-Escribano 2003). Cullen and Gruber 
(1996) report evidence that families are liquidity-constrained during unemployment spells. 
This finding is consistent with Stephens (2001), where empirical results for layoffs are 
consistent with liquidity-constrained households. Similarly, Garcia-Escribano (2003) finds 
that households with limited credit access rely on the labor supply of wives to smooth the 
husband’s earnings shocks.  
The empirical results in the literature investigating the ‘added worker effect’ remains 
mixed. Arguments put forward in support for the ‘added worker effect’ include: the 
substitutability of leisure of husbands and wives in home production (Ashenfelter 1980; 
Lundberg 1985; Maloney 1987); an income effect (Maloney 1987; Prieto and Rodriguez 
2000); and, the presence of liquidity constraints (Mincer 1962; Lundberg 1985; Cullen and 
Gruber 1996; Finegan and Margo 1994; Garcia-Escribano 2003).  
On the other hand, other factors that may obscure this effect include: assortative 
mating in tastes for work among spouses (Maloney 1991; Lundberg 1985; Cullen and 
Gruber 1996); the wife’s employment factors are affected by the same factors causing the 
husband’s unemployment, or the ‘discouraged worker effect’ (Serneels 2002; Prieto and 
Rodriguez 2000; Baslevent and Oneran 2001); a crowding out effect from social insurance 
programs (Cullen and Gruber 1996; Finegan and Margo 1994); the value of the 
unemployment benefit is linked to the wage received by the wife (Cullen and Gruber 1996); 
complementarity of leisure between spouses and caregiving needs (Coile 2004); and, 
different measurement approaches (Lundberg 1985). 
Among the knowledge gaps that emerge from this brief review is the consideration of 
liquidity constraints. While it has been cited as the driving force for the ‘added worker effect’ 
in the life cycle context, few studies explicitly include liquidity constraints in their empirical 
models. This line of research is perhaps more relevant for rural areas in developing 
countries where credit markets are imperfect and there are little or no unemployment 
benefits.  
In addition, only two studies extend the notion of the ‘added worker’ to other family 
members (Serneels 2002; Kochar 1999), although in general, the ‘added worker effect’ 
refers to all potential secondary earners in the family, including children. This point may have  
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been irrelevant in the developed country context where households are often nuclear, but it 
is not so in the case of developing countries. A number of studies have linked child labor 
with income shortfalls and credit constraints (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997, Dehejia and Gatti 
2002), emphasizing that parents may be forced to draw on their children’s labor when other 
strategies such as credit are not available. 
Only a handful of studies on the ‘added worker effect’ use data on developing 
countries, primarily as a consequence of the dearth of panel data. Such studies would also 
require analytical methods more suited to the specific labor market characteristics in the 
developing country context. Also, sources of income shocks may be more diverse for 
agricultural households (not merely unemployment), and the ‘added worker effect’ is relevant 
for all potential secondary workers, which include children. An exception is the work by 
Kochar (1999), which estimated hours of work responses to idiosyncratic crop shocks in 
rural India. Her model distinguishes labor supply by gender, and all household members 
aged 15 to 45 may contribute to labor income. However, her model does not accommodate 
credit constraints. 
3. Conceptual  framework 
This section begins with a discussion of the agricultural household model to establish 
the theoretical relationships we wish to explore. Next, we discuss the theoretical treatment of 
permanent versus transitory shocks and its implications on market labor supply. 
3.1  Agricultural household model 
The model adopted here belongs to the subset of agricultural household models that 
investigate the impact of market imperfections on household decision-making (Eswaran and 
Kotwal 1986, Carter and Zimmerman 2000). This model assumes that the household acts as 
a single optimizing agent, and, facing exogenous factor prices, maximizes per-period 
expected utility subject to a working capital constraint and a time endowment constraint 
(Eswaran and Kotwal 1986). Farm output is a function of land and own farm labor, and the 
linearly homogenous, increasing, strictly quasiconcave, and twice differentiable production 
function is given by:  
(1)  ) ; , ( θ
o h L f q = , 
where 
o h  is own-farm labor hours, L is land cultivated, and θ  is the realization of 
weather and other crop income shocks. As in Eswaran and Kotwal (1986), we assume that 
production entails the incurrence of fixed setup costs (representing other inputs), K, and that  
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each household has access to some amount B  of working capital (including credit), typically 
determined by the amount of assets they possess. Finally, we assume the household’s utility 
function is defined over the present value of current period earnings, Y, and leisure: U( Y , l; 
z ) = Y + u( l; z ), where z is a vector of observed and unobserved variables affecting 
preferences, and u’>0, u”<0.  
The household’s optimization problem is thus given by:
  
(2)  ) ( ) ( ) ; , ( max
} , , , { l u K L L v wh h L f p
m o
L l h h
m o + − − − + θ β ,  
s.t. (2.1)  K vL wh L v B
m + ≥ + + ,    [working capital constraint] 
  (2.2)  0 ≥ − − − Ω l h h
m o ,    [time  endowment  constraint] 
  (2.3)  0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ l h h L
m o , [nonnegativity  constraints] 
where β  is the per period discount factor, L is land rented out, p is output price, w is 
the market wage, v is rent, and Ω is the time endowment. This model can easily be extended 
to distinguish the labor hours of members according to gender by disaggregating hours of 
work and wages for females and males.  
This optimization yields market labor supply functions that depend on net access to 
working capital, output price, wage, rent, production shocks, and preference shifters. 
(3)  ) , ; , , , ( z v w p B h h
m m θ = ,  
where net access to working capital is given by the sum, L v K B B + − = .  
While the previous treatment assumes that the household will opt to cultivate, 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) note that a household will do so only if their maximized utility 
under cultivation exceeds that of being a pure agricultural worker. As pure agricultural 
workers, the household’s maximization problem is given by:  
(4)  ) ; ( max ) ; , , , (
*
0 z h u vL wh B z v w L B U
m m
h
m − Ω + + + = .  
Therefore, the household will cultivate if and only if: 
(5)  ) ; , , , ( ) , ; , , , (
*
0
* z v w L B U z v w p B U > θ . 
While only production and preference shocks are introduced in this theoretical 
framework, a non-cultivator household may experience shocks to their current income in the 
form of other adverse shocks, (Y – ε) in which case it is clear that the asset stock B will be  
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used to buffer the impact of the shock. Households whose asset stocks are low are more 
likely to find that  ε < B , and as such are expected be credit-constrained. 
3.2  Permanent versus transitory shocks 
According to the permanent income hypothesis, consumption is constant over the 
lifecycle and depends on permanent income. Temporary fluctuations in income are thus 
smoothed through credit and savings and should not affect consumption. Following this 
argument, only permanent shocks should affect labor decisions. 
Contrary to the permanent income hypothesis, the ‘added worker’ hypothesis 
predicts that negative transitory shocks to household income, through shocks on farm profits 
(e.g. crop failure) or earnings of other family members (e.g. unemployment), will result in a 
contemporaneous increase in market hours of work, all other things being equal. The theory 
also implies that the increase in market hours of work will be temporary, and will no longer 
be necessary once the shock has subsided. 
In his classic article on female labor supply, Mincer (1962) showed that in a given 
period, the ‘temporary’ reduction in family income due to the husband’s unemployment 
increases the probability that the wife will participate in the labor market in that period. He 
emphasized that this effect is expected when the family has few consumption-smoothing 
alternatives: “However, if assets are low or not liquid, and access to the capital market is 
costly or nonexistent, it might be preferable to make the adjustment to a drop in family 
income on the money income side rather than on the money expenditure side … a transitory 
increase in labor force participation of the wife may well be an alternative to dissaving, asset 
decumulation, or increasing debt.” (Mincer 1962) 
On the other hand, Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) observed that ‘permanent’ factors 
resulting in higher unemployment probability of the husband should increase the labor 
supply of wives over their lifetimes, and not only during the periods of unemployment. Thus, 
in a life-cycle setting, the ‘added worker effect’ cannot be expected to be large unless in the 
presence of credit constraints (Lundberg 1985; Heckman and MaCurdy 1980). Lundberg 
(1985) notes that without such a constraint, the wealth effect of a short unemployment spell 
is likely to be small. Thus, contemporaneous movements in the labor supply of a married 
couple will reflect only cross-substitution effects, which are expected to be small.  
Because the literature on the ‘added worker effect’ refers to contemporaneous labor 
supply adjustments, we confine our study to the impact of negative shocks
4 occurring in the 
                                                 
4 We are unable to classify shocks as ‘transitory’ or ‘permanent’ using econometric methods because 
this requires a panel data set. Instead, some shocks may be intuitively interpreted as transitory or  
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current period on off-farm labor supply. If credit constraints are binding, both transitory and 
permanent shocks are expected to result in labor supply adjustments in the current period.  
4. Data  description 
This study uses 2003 data from Bukidnon, Philippines, which is a resurvey of 
households from a four-round panel survey conducted in 1984-85. The household sampling 
procedure in 1984/85 was conducted using a quasi-experimental design to compare 
households that shifted to sugarcane production and households that did not following the 
construction of a sugar mill in the province in 1977. The survey area extended beyond the 
neighborhood of the sugar mill, to include households that did not have the opportunity to 
adopt sugar (due to prohibitive transport costs) but shared a common farming environment 
and cultural heritage with sugar-adopting households (Bouis and Haddad 1990). There were 
448 households surveyed in all four rounds, and the last three rounds can be aggregated to 
comprise a full year.  
The 2003 data resurveys 305 of the core 448 households in 1984/85, as well as 257 
new households formed by children from the original households who are now living in 
separate households.
5  From these 562 households, we include 234 original and 229 split 
households who have both spouses present. Because the 1984/85 data provides very few 
variables on adverse shocks, we confine our labor supply analysis to the 2003 data.  
4.1 Identifying  credit-constrained  households 
As a general definition, we define a household to be credit-constrained if it would like 
to borrow, for whatever purpose, but cannot obtain credit from any source. We do not 
distinguish between formal and informal credit sources as they can function equally well in 
protecting consumption from income shocks.  
One common method of testing for credit constraints is the consumption insurance 
hypothesis. If the growth rate of household consumption covaries with the growth rate of 
household income, then the household is said to be credit-constrained. However, one cannot 
simply look at the smoothness of consumption and know which mechanisms are at work. If 
labor income can be used to smooth consumption, consumption will appear to be insured 
even in the presence of binding credit constraints. Thus, to identify households that face 
                                                                                                                                                        
permanent. For example, death of a household member is a permanent shock, while pest infestation 
is a transitory shock.  
5 The 2003 survey initially surveyed 311 original households and 261 split households. Of these 572 
households, 10 households were dropped due to missing age and/or sex data for at least one of the 
household members.   
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binding credit constraints, a direct approach based on household responses to qualitative 
questions on credit will be necessary.  
In the data, the question “If more credit were available for [purpose] in the past 
12 months, would you have used it? Why not?” was included in the Assets, Backyard 
Production, Family Business, Farm Production, and Non-Food Expenditures blocks. Based 
on this question, households responding “Yes” to the qualitative question are classified as 
self-reported credit-constrained. We then constructed a summary indicator variable for credit 
constraints, where households are classified as credit-constrained if they answered “Yes” to 
the credit constraint question in at least one block. 
4.2  Measuring household income shocks 
From the theoretical model, labor supply functions depend on a set of variables 
including farm profits, non-labor income, and earnings of other household members. Shocks 
entering through any of these factors may result in adjustments in market labor supplied for 
credit-constrained households. Because our data deals with agricultural households, 
fluctuations in crop income are significant sources of household income shocks.  
Several approaches may be used to measure crop income shocks. The first 
alternative is to use the residual from a profit regression (Kochar 1999). Positive and 
negative residuals may be treated as separate shocks, since strategies used by households 
to respond to positive shocks are expected to be very different from strategies used to 
respond to negative shocks. One problem with this approach is that this residual contains 
unobserved variables that determine household expectations, as well as measurement error 
in profits. Because the profit regression excludes costs of family labor and other family 
owned inputs, it also contains unobserved preference shocks that determine leisure choices.  
The second alternative is to use standard instrumental variables techniques. This 
avoids the problems associated with the first approach if there is an instrument that is 
correlated with the “true” idiosyncratic crop shock but not with preference shocks or 
measurement error in crop profits.  
Although the Bukidnon data set provides a wide set of instruments,
6 predicted crop 
income shocks obtained using instrumental variables techniques did not result in coefficient 
estimates significantly different from zero. Alternatively, we include self-reported incidents of 
adverse shocks occurring between 1984 and 2003. Various sources of shocks are 
documented including: weather or environmental shocks affecting crops or livestock (e.g. 
                                                 
6 Instruments used include rainfall deviations from the long-run average and incidents of crop failure 
due to drought and pests, as well as their interactions with farm characteristics (e.g. farm size, crop 
choice), and incidents and duration of illness by household members.  
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drought, flooding, pests, diseases); war, civil conflict, banditry and crime (e.g. theft, military 
presence); political, social and legal events (e.g. confiscation of land, land reform), 
unexpected economic shocks (e.g. unemployment, severe lack of financing, severe inability 
to sell inputs); and unexpected events affecting health or welfare of members
7 (e.g. death, 
illness, disablement, disability? divorce, abandonment). Respondents are reminded that the 
shocks they report must have been difficult to foresee and must have significantly affected 
their households. 
We construct count data for the number of incidents for each type of shock and 
distinguish between two time periods: past shocks are defined as occurring before 2003, 
while current shocks are defined as occurring in 2003. Table 1 presents a list of specific 
shock categories used in the analysis. 
4.3 Descriptive  statistics 
The means and standard deviations for selected variables are presented separately 
for original and split households in table 2. As we expected, the two groups exhibited 
statistically significant differences in the means of a majority of the variables, reflecting the 
life cycle differences between the two sets of households. 
Original households are larger on average, with more prime-age male members and 
less prime-age females than split households. Split households on average have more 
young children and school-age children, while original households have more elderly 
members. Interestingly, the prime-age members of original households are younger on 
average compared with prime-age members of split households. It is possible that children 
set up their own households after a certain age, while the younger adult children are more 
likely to continue living with their parents. 
As expected, heads of original households and their spouses are older and less 
educated than their counterparts in split households. Based on these averages, it appears 
that although original households are ‘older’ in the sense that there are more elderly 
members and older household heads and spouses, they actually have a larger pool of 
prime-age workers. 
Original households are also wealthier than split households on average. They own 
more land, more rent-earning assets, and more livestock than split households. They are 
more likely to be engaged in farming their own land, have higher loans in the past year, and 
are more likely to welcome more credit for production purposes. On the other hand, almost 
                                                 
7 Shocks affecting the health and welfare of the household differ from the other shocks in that it can 
alter the labor endowment of the household. The effect of this type of shock on labor supply is 
ambiguous.  
  13
half of split households do not farm or own any land. This could also explain why on 
average, both males and females in original households work more days in their own farms 
compared with split households. While the number of days worked in off farm employment 
by males are not statistically different between the two groups, females in split households 
work less days on average compared with females in original households.  
Because of the longer history of original households, it is expected that they report 
more incidents of adverse shocks occurring over the last twenty years compared with split 
households. On the other hand, there does not seem to be a significant difference between 
the experience of current shocks for original and split households except for other weather 
shocks and other welfare shocks. Original households report a higher incidence of these two 
shocks during the year, which is plausible because of their greater involvement in farming 
and their demographic composition. 
5. Empirical  analysis 
We conduct separate analysis for original versus split households for two reasons. 
First, because split households are formed by children of original households: the two 
groups are not independent, having shared common characteristics in the past. Second, the 
two groups of households are at different stages of their life cycle.
8  Original households are 
expected to have an older demographic composition compared with the splits, and each 
group may respond differently to adverse shocks. 
First-order conditions from the household’s utility maximization yield market days of 
work equations for female and male labor. Because farm households rely primarily on family 
labor for crop production, corner solutions (i.e. zero market days of work) are expected to be 
significant for both females and males. Thus, market days of work functions may be 
estimated using Tobit regressions, where observed days  )) ( ( ⋅
m h  equal desired days  )) ( ( ⋅
∗ h  
when the latter are positive and zero otherwise. For labor category i in household j, desired 
market days of work equation is given by:  
(6)  ij ij j ij ij ij V Z x h ε α θ α α α α + + + ′ + + =
∗
4 3 2 1 0 ' ' '  
where xij is a vector of  household characteristics,  Zij is a vector of production and 
demographic shift variables, Vj is a vector of location dummies,  ij θ  is a vector of adverse 
shock variables, and  ij ε  is an error term with mean zero. If credit constraints are not binding, 
                                                 
8 In the Philippines, the process of setting up independent households by children is more of a life 
cycle phenomenon rather than a choice variable. When the children marry, they typically stay with 
their parents in the beginning and then later set up their own household.   
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the sign of  4 α  is ambiguous, because the set of coping strategies used by the household to 
respond to adverse shocks would depend on the accessibility of various coping strategies. 
On the other hand, if credit constraints are binding, we expect  4 α  to be positive for both 
permanent and transitory shocks. 
Because the presence of binding credit constraints narrows the set of coping 
strategies available to the household, and consequently increases the importance of labor 
supply adjustments as a coping strategy, it is important to incorporate the effect of credit 
constraints in our analysis of labor supply. Note that a household is credit-constrained if its 
demand for credit, the difference between consumption and income, exceeds its credit limit. 
Since the credit constraint status of the household is clearly endogenous, we cannot 
simply split the sample according to the summary indicator variables we have constructed, 
or include the indicator variable as a regressor. Instead, we attempt to correct for the 
presence of binding credit constraints by first estimating a probit model of credit constraints: 
(7)  cc cc cc cc cc
probit
cc u W k k k + = > =




cc k  is an observable binary outcome given by 
*
cc k  credit constraints;  cc W  
are credit demand and supply variables that explain credit constraints; and,  cc u  is a mean 
zero error term.  
From the probit estimates, we compute for the inverse Mills’ ratio and include this as 
a regressor in the Tobit estimation of the days worked equation for females and males: 
(8)  ij cc cc ij j ij ij ij IMR V Z x h ε γ α θ α α α α + + + + ′ + + =
∗
4 3 2 1 0 ' ' ' . 
Market wage rates & crop profits. Because we are considering multiple-worker 
households, there is an empirical issue as to what the relevant market wage is for the 
household. The conventional approach to this problem is to take gender- and year- specific 
village average wages as the wage applicable to broad aggregates of household labor 
(Rose, 1992; Skoufias, 1994). Kochar (1999) develops an alternative approach based on the 
observation that total labor hours in agriculture is the sum of hours spent in distinct 
agricultural tasks, with little variation across individuals performing the same task. Thus, 
wage rates for aggregate household labor can be calculated as the weighted average of 
village-year-gender and task-specific wages, with the share of household time devoted to 
specific tasks as weights.  
However, Kochar (1999) also notes that since observed wages also reflect 
household decisions on how much time is spent on each activity, this measure will be  
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endogenous and correlated with unobserved characteristics affecting market hours. Since 
our research objectives do not require an explicit measure of wages, we follow Kochar’s 
(1999) approach in substituting for market wages its exogenous determinants (primarily 
demographic variables) that determine the household’s choice of market activities.  
The same approach is used in the treatment of crop profits. The use of instrumental 
variables techniques did not result in significant estimates for predicted profits in the Tobit 
estimation of days worked. As we noted earlier, however, crop profits may lead to biased 
estimates due to measurement errors and unobserved variables. Instead, we include the 
self-reported incidents of crop failure as regressors in the labor supply estimation and omit 
crop profits as a regressor in favor of its exogenous determinants that determine production 
decisions. These include farm characteristics, household head characteristics affecting farm 
productivity, demographic variables, and location dummies to account for price levels and 
level of economic activity.  
6. Results 
6.1  Credit constraint estimates 
In our estimation of credit constraints, we include as regressors independent 
variables that influence either the demand or supply of credit (or both):  household size, the 
dependency ratio, household head characteristics (ethnicity, age, age squared, highest 
grade attained), number of prime-age males and females, area of land cultivated, dummy 
variables for crop choice (sugar, corn and rice), number of adverse shocks occurring before 
2003, a dummy variable =1 if the household has borrowed at least once in the past year, 
and location dummies. Results of the probits for both original and split households are 
presented in table 3. 
We find that original households involved in sugar production as well as corn 
production are more likely to be credit constrained. This may be explained by the higher 
working capital requirement of these crops (particularly sugar), relative to other crops (rice, 
vegetables, coconut, etc). Also, original households belonging to the 2
nd and 3
rd asset 
quintiles are more likely to be credit constrained relative to those in the lowest quintile. This 
could be reflecting higher demand for credit if these households are able to operate their 
farms or family businesses at a larger scale than households with less assets. 
In addition, original households are more likely to be credit constrained if they have 
already borrowed at least once in the past year. Having borrowed in the past year could 
indicate a draw on the household’s credit limit, so that additional demand for loans may no 
longer be accommodated in full.  
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Finally, original households are more likely to be credit constrained the more adverse 
shocks it has experienced in the last 20 years. This supports the view that persistent shocks 
have lasting effects on household welfare, since shocks occurring in the past continue to 
strongly influence current credit constraints. 
As for the split households, we find that a number of household characteristics 
significantly explain the credit constraint status of the household. The household head’s age 
and age squared, and the number of prime-age males and females in the household all 
contribute to the probability that the household will be credit constrained. If the age of the 
household head captures experience and unobserved variables affecting productivity and 
credit-worthiness, then this result is contrary to what we would expect. However, both the 
age and labor endowments of the household could be capturing the effect on demand for 
credit rather than supply, so that a household with more experience in farming, and more 
labor endowments may be operating at a larger scale and therefore would demand more 
working capital. We also find that split households with more land cultivated, and those 
belonging to the 3
rd and 4
th asset quintiles are more likely to be credit constrained. This 
seems to fit into our explanation that households with more assets (land, prime-age workers, 
etc.) are more likely to be operating their farms or family businesses at a higher scale and 
would require more credit for working capital. 
Similar to the findings for original households, split households are also more likely to 
be credit constrained the more shocks it has experienced in the past, and if it has already 
borrowed in the past year. As we have noted above, this could simply be capturing a draw 
on the household’s credit limit. 
The probit model for both sub-samples performed relatively well in predicting the self-
reported credit constraint status of households. The model correctly predicted the credit 
constraint status of 68 percent of the sub-sample of original households, and correctly 
predicted the credit constraint status of 74 percent of the sub-sample of split households. 
6.2  Labor supply responses 
Our findings for the Tobit regressions are presented in table 4 for original 
households, and table 5 for the split households. We used days worked off-farm in the past 
year as the dependent variable, and ran separate regressions for total days worked, 
agricultural days worked, and non-agricultural days worked (where total days is the sum of 
agricultural and non-agricultural days worked) for males and females, and by household 
type.   
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We include the following independent variable as regressors:  household 
characteristics (household size; number of young children; household head’s age, age 
squared, height, and highest grade attained; asset quintiles), production and demographic 
shift characteristics (area of land owned and its square; sugar, corn or rice producer; 
number, mean age, and mean age squared of prime-aged males and females; number of 
prime-aged males and females with secondary and higher education), incidents of current 
shocks, location dummies, and the inverse Mills’ ratios computed from the corresponding 
probit regression. A summary of the signs of significant shock coefficients are presented in 
table 6 below: 
Table 6: Summary of Signs of Significant Shock Variables 
Original HHs  Split HHs 
 
Males Females  Males  Females 












Drought   (+)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)     (-)   (-)  
Pests before 
harvest 
            (-)    (-) 
Other  weather (-)         (+)  (-)      (-) 
Other negative 
economic 
  (+)      (-)           
Civil war/theft      (+)      (-)    (-)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (-) 
Death of HH 
member 
     (-)         (+)    (+) 
Illness of HH 
member 
        ( - )        
Other  welfare         (+)  (-)  (+)  (-)  (-)  (-) 
For original households, we find that males work more in agricultural off-farm jobs in 
response to droughts and other negative economic shocks, and work more in non-
agricultural off-farm jobs in response to incidents of civil war/theft. This ‘added worker effect’ 
for male workers is contrary to the hypothesis that male workers are already labor 
constrained and can no longer increase labor supplied. On the other hand, we find a 
‘discouraged worker effect’ for males in non-agricultural off-farm work in response to 
droughts as well. This result is unexpected because we anticipate a weather shock such as 
a drought to affect the demand for agricultural workers rather than non-agricultural workers. 
Instead, we find the opposite here: male workers are able to work more in agricultural jobs, 
and work less in non-agricultural jobs in response to a drought. One possible explanation is 
that non-agricultural jobs may be strongly interlinked with agricultural activity (e.g.  
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downstream services and industries such as transportation, food processing, etc.) so much 
so that it is more likely to suffer more when farm production is low.  
On the other hand, we find that females in original households work less in both 
agricultural and non-agricultural off-farm jobs in response to droughts. Since we expect a 
sudden fall in agricultural activity during droughts, it is possible that there is some 
substitution between male and female workers especially if male workers are the preferred 
type of labor for certain types of agricultural work.
9  This observation is corroborated in the 
qualitative case studies conducted in our study area (Montillo-Burton, 2005), where 
agricultural jobs are rationed to male workers during agricultural slack periods.  
Females in original households also work less days in non-agricultural off-farm jobs 
in response to other negative economic shocks, incidents of civil war/theft, and work less 
days in agricultural jobs in response to deaths of household members. This result could be 
reflecting a reallocation of men and women’s time between off-farm work, and own-farm and 
domestic work. Note that for other negative economic shocks and civil war/theft, males are 
able to increase days worked off-farm, but women decrease days worked off-farm. If either 
males are more valuable in the labor market or if there are other barriers to the participation 
of women in the labor market, it is possible that in the event of such types of shocks, men 
are tasked to increase income through wages while women take over more tasks at home 
and in their own farms. 
In the case of split households, we find that the various environmental shocks 
(drought, pests and weather disturbances) almost always result in a decrease in off-farm 
days worked for both males and females, except for other weather shocks where males are 
able to increase days worked in agricultural jobs. We also find that males work less in 
agricultural off-farm jobs but work more in non-agricultural off-farm jobs in response to 
incidents of civil war/theft and other welfare shocks. Females, on the other hand, work less 
in both agricultural and non-agricultural off-farm jobs in response to both types of shocks.  
Finally, we find that females in split households increase days worked in non-
agricultural jobs in response to incidents of death in the household, while males decrease 
agricultural days worked off-farm in response to illness. Both these results are within our 
expectations. If the household member who died was of prime working age, then the 
response of females could be interpreted as truly an ‘added worker effect’ where they 
attempt to replace the lost income by working off-farm in non-agricultural jobs. On the other 
hand, if the household member who died is a child or an elderly member, then this may 
actually reduce the domestic responsibilities of women at home so that they are now able to 
                                                 
9 For example, land preparation and hauling of sugarcane are male-dominated activities.  
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work off-farm. In the case of illness, this is a type of shock which temporarily reduces the 
endowment of labor (especially if it is the male members who fell ill), so it is not surprising 
that males work less in response to it. 
Comparing the two sub-samples, we note that while male workers seem to perform 
the ‘added worker’ function in original households, both males and females are able to do so 
in split households. In particular, since split households are better educated on average than 
their parent households, it appears they are better able to increase labor supplied to non-
agricultural work for both males and females. Also, while environmental shocks appear to be 
highly important for both groups in explaining days worked off-farm, split households seem 
to be more vulnerable as they respond to a larger variety of shocks compared with original 
households. 
Lastly, none of the coefficients for the inverse Mills’ ratios were significant. This 
implies that the household’s credit constraint status does not influence the household’s off-
farm labor decisions. This sheds some doubts on the hypothesis that households smooth 
consumption primarily through credit, because households that were not credit constrained 
need not resort to labor supply adjustments in response to adverse shocks. Instead, our 
results suggest that households resort to labor supply adjustments independently of their 
ability to borrow. In fact, the converse may be true: households may borrow in response to 
an adverse shock only when they are unable to raise the additional funds through wages. 
Whether or not this is indeed the case requires further investigation, although this 
observation is in line with Kochar’s (1995) argument that well-functioning labor markets 
reduce the need to resort to asset depletion and other costly ex ante measures. 
7.  Summary and conclusion 
We find that males and females respond differently to different types of adverse 
shocks. For both original and split households, we find evidence for labor demand 
constraints in both agricultural and non-agricultural off-farm jobs in response to 
environmental shocks, although males seem to be able to overcome such labor constraints. 
If either males are more valuable in the labor market or if there are barriers to women’s 
participation in the labor market, women may be unable to maintain much less increase 
labor supplied off-farm because the limited opportunities (due to the aggregate weather 
shock) are rationed to men. 
Also, we find that only males are able to work more off-farm in response to shocks in 
original households, while both males and females are able to increase off-farm work in 
response to adverse shocks in split households. We attribute this difference to the higher  
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average educational attainment of split households compared with their parents, so that they 
are better able to access non-agricultural jobs off-farm. In particular, higher education for 
females was highly significant in explaining days worked in non-agricultural jobs for both 
original and split households. 
None of the coefficients for the inverse Mills’ ratios were significant in explaining off-
farm labor supply, which sheds some doubts on the hypothesis that households smooth 
consumption primarily through credit. Our results suggest that households resort to labor 
supply adjustments independently of their ability to borrow, which is in line with Kochar’s 
(1995) argument that well-functioning labor markets reduces the need to resort to asset 
depletion and other costly ex ante measures. 
Although an evaluation of the effectiveness of these labor adjustment strategies is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that households that are disadvantaged with 
respect to the quality and quantity of their labor endowments are least likely to cope well with 
adverse shocks. Our results suggest that the most vulnerable households are those with 
little education and with few or no able-bodied male members. 
Adverse environmental shocks in particular appear to be one of the most serious 
shocks faced by households. It is even worse for households with few males because as we 
noted, female labor supply responses to these shocks are always negative for both original 
and split households. Clearly, there is an opportunity for counter-cyclical bad weather 
workfare programs to improve the welfare of vulnerable households in this case. Such a 
program could be designed to target households who are unable to use labor markets to 
compensate for lost incomes, i.e. households with high female-to-male ratios, households 
with high dependency ratios, and households with little or no education. 
In addition to this bad weather workfare program, a medium- to long-run policy 
response is the provision of universal education and health care. These programs are likely 
to be effective in strengthening the labor endowments of households and improving their 
ability to cope with adverse shocks in the future. 
Finally, further investigation is necessary to explain the barriers to women’s 
participation in labor markets or other such institutional constraints, especially in light of 
weather shocks. Qualitative and anthropological approaches may be particularly useful in 
describing the peculiarities of this case. Once identified, there may be more specific and 
effective ways to ease the labor constraint for women other than what we have proposed. 
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Table 1: 2003 Shock Categories and Variable Names 
 
Variable Name*
Weather or environmental shocks
ndroughtp/03 Drought
npestshp/03 Pests or diseases that affected crops before they were harvested (bugs/rats)






Pests or diseases that led to storage losses
Crop loss due to fires
Pests or diseases that affected livestock (livestock death)
Livestock death due to heat
Overall bad harvest season
ncivwarp/03 War, civil conflict, banditry or crime shocks
Destruction, confiscation or theft of tools or inputs for production
Theft of cash
Theft of stored crops
Destruction or theft of housing
Destruction or theft of consumer goods
Military presence (reduced mobility/ increased tension)
nnegsocp/03 Negative political, social or legal events
Confiscation of land
Confiscation of other assets
Land reform
Resettlement, villagization or forced migration
Forced contributions or arbitrary taxation
Imprisonment for political reasons
Discrimination for political reasons
Discrimination for social or ethnic reasons
Contract dispute or default affecting access to land
Contract dispute or default affecting access to other inputs
Contract dispute or default affecting sale of products
Negative economic shock
ncapitalp** Severe, temporary lack of financing/ capital
Severe, temporary lack of access to inputs
Increase in input prices
Decrease in output prices
Severe, temporary lack of demand or inability to sell agricultural products
Severe, temporary lack of demand or inability to sell non-agricultural products
Unable to obtain labour at key crop cycle times
Break down of processing services
Break down in transportation services
Unemployment
Unexpected change in government regulation concerning income generating sources
Shock regarding health or welfare of household
Death of husband
Death of wife





Disablement of working adult household members
Disablement of other household members
Divorce
Abandonment
Disputes with extended family members regarding land
Disputes with extended family regarding other assets
Co-op failed due to mismanagement
Unexpected change in government regulation concerning eligibility for programatic assistance
*Shock variables with suffix "-p" refer to past shocks, occurring between 1985 and 2002; shock variables with suffix "-03" refer to current shocks occuring in 2003.
















Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Original and Split Households 
   Original Households  Split Households    
 N=305  N=257   
Variable label  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.    
          
Demographic characteristics         
no of hh members  6.380  3.340  4.774  2.182  *** 
no of children aged <6 in hh  0.495  0.753  1.280  0.901  *** 
no of children aged 6-15  0.833  1.104  1.008  1.196  * 
no of elderly aged >65 in hh  0.170  0.559  0.012  0.108  *** 
no of male household members aged 15-45  1.980  1.953  1.319  0.824  *** 
no of female household members aged 15-45  1.141  1.191  1.304  0.791  * 
age of male spouse in hh  48.433  18.684  31.136  7.783  *** 
age of female spouse in hh  50.210  10.828  28.891  6.537  *** 
ave age of male household members aged 15-45  19.632  11.427  29.357  7.406  *** 
ave age of female household members aged 15-45  17.414  14.081  27.741  5.548  *** 
highest grade attained by male spouse in hh  15.446  9.426  21.089  7.432  *** 
highest grade attained by female spouse in hh  17.826  6.474  23.354  6.073  *** 
no of males aged 15-45 w/ elem educ  0.003  0.057  0.000  0.000   
no of females aged 15-45 w/ elem educ  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   
no of males aged 15-45 w/ secondary educ  0.790  1.119  0.494  0.691  *** 
no of females aged 15-45 w/ secondary educ  0.554  0.789  0.739  0.833  *** 
no of males aged 15-45 w/ higher educ  0.302  0.674  0.218  0.467  * 
no of females aged 15-45 w/ higher educ  0.282  0.573  0.245  0.490   
         
HH & Farm characteristics         
age of hhh  54.679  7.628  31.693  6.785  *** 
highest grade attained by hhh  17.331  7.961  21.377  6.971  *** 
ln height of hhh  52.479  17.101  53.979  20.555   
total hectares of land owned  2.418  5.379  0.307  1.704  *** 
=1 if HH does not own land  0.213  0.410  0.463  0.500  *** 
=1 if tenant farmer  0.623  0.485  0.572  0.500   
total hectares of land rented  0.421  1.497  0.387  0.867   
total hectares of land cultivated  3.103  7.314  0.836  1.503  *** 
=1 if sugar producer  0.374  0.485  0.218  0.414  *** 
=1 if corn producer  0.370  0.484  0.245  0.431  *** 
=1 if rice producer  0.213  0.410  0.140  0.348  ** 
present value of rent-earning assets  14,019  79,589  1,001  6,353  *** 
net present value of all animals owned by hh  3,797  5,604  2,227  4,512  *** 
         
Credit variables         
=1 if ever loaned in last 12 months  0.786  0.412  0.723  0.449  * 
total amount borrowed during past 12 months-all sources  32,726  101,465  10,834  26,281  *** 
=1 if would like more credit in at least one block  0.472  0.500  0.385  0.488  ** 
=1 if would like more credit for farm production  0.239  0.427  0.160  0.367  ** 
=1 if would like more credit for backyard production  0.216  0.412  0.183  0.387   
=1 if would like more credit for family business  0.115  0.319  0.058  0.235  ** 
=1 if would like more credit for non-food expenditures  0.197  0.398  0.191  0.394   
=1 if would like more credit for assets  0.131  0.338  0.132  0.339   
Work variables         
days worked in own farm by male hh members  40.570  84.825  18.638  43.552  *** 
days worked in own farm by female hh members  13.062  40.717  4.403  19.973  *** 
days worked in all off-farm employment by male hh members  146.666  208.002  143.588  140.682   
days worked in all off-farm employment by female hh members  60.525  119.586  40.453  85.790  ** 
no of school-age children participating in paid/unpaid work  0.364  0.762  0.311  0.753    
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Original and Split Households (continued) 
  Original Households  Split Households   
 N=305  N=257   
Variable label  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  
          
Past shocks          
no of incidents of drought before 2003  0.387  0.488  0.109  0.312  *** 
no of incidents of pest infestation before harvest before 2003  0.256  0.437  0.117  0.345  *** 
no of incidents of other weather shocks before 2003  0.157  0.407  0.062  0.242  *** 
no of incidents of civil war before 2003  0.128  0.354  0.039  0.194  *** 
no of incidents of negative political social or legal events before 
2003 
0.072 0.272  0.012 0.108  *** 
no of incidents of severe lack of financing before 2003  0.066  0.248  0.035  0.184   
no of incidents of other negative economic shocks before 2003  0.052  0.223  0.016  0.124  ** 
no of incidents of death before 2003  0.246  0.475  0.039  0.231  *** 
no of incidents of illness before 2003  0.328  0.548  0.276  0.521   
no of incidents of other welfare shocks before 2003  0.075  0.277  0.019  0.138  *** 
no of incidents of all types of adverse shocks before 2003  1.767  1.331  0.724  0.938  *** 
          
Current shocks          
no of incidents of drought in 2003  0.003  0.057  0.012  0.108   
no of incidents of pest infestation before harvest in 2003  0.026  0.160  0.012  0.108   
no of incidents of other weather shocks in 2003  0.039  0.195  0.008  0.088  ** 
no of incidents of civil war in 2003  0.013  0.114  0.004  0.062   
no of incidents of negative political social or legal events in 2003  0.007  0.081  0.000  0.000   
no of incidents of other negative economic shocks in 2003  0.003  0.057  0.016  0.124   
no of incidents of death in 2003  0.026  0.160  0.016  0.124   
no of incidents of illness in 2003  0.069  0.266  0.093  0.305   
no of incidents of other welfare shocks in 2003  0.020  0.139  0.004  0.062  * 
no of incidents of all types of adverse shocks in 2003  0.207  0.466  0.163  0.420   
                 
Note: Means of the two groups were tested using a t-test with equal variances, P > |t|; *** p-value was significant at the 1% level, 




Table 3: Probit Results 
    
   
  ORIGINAL HHS  SPLIT HHS 
        
 [1]  [2] 
Variables  Credit- constrained  Credit- constrained 
      
hh size  0.033           (0.114) 
dependency ratio  0.576          0.092 
=1 if hh head is Cebuano            0.588 
age of hh head  0.127           0.216  ** 
age of hh head squared  (0.001)           (0.003)  ** 
highest grade attained by hh head  (0.008)           (0.004) 
number of prime age males in hh, aged 15-45  0.003          0.141 
number of prime age females in hh, aged 15-45  (0.069)          0.302  ** 
land area cultivated  (0.016)          0.131  ** 
asset quintile 2  0.549  *        0.233 
asset quintile 3  0.583  **        0.633  ** 
asset quintile 4  0.375          0.986  *** 
asset quintile 5  0.456           0.550 
 = 1 if sugar producer  0.352  *          (0.018) 
 = 1 if corn producer  0.398  **           0.104 
 = 1 if rice producer  0.041            (0.065) 
no of shocks experienced in 1984-2002  0.258  ***           0.198  ** 
=1 if loaned in past 12 mos  0.587  ***           0.504  ** 
municipality 2  (0.588)           (0.449) 
municipality 3  (0.252)            (0.313) 
municipality 4  (1.017)  **          (0.031) 
municipality 5  (0.377)             0.203 
municipality 6  (0.577)            (0.584) 
municipality 7  (1.052)  *          (0.531) 
municipality 8  (1.133)  **          (0.848)  * 
municipality 9  (0.678)  *          (0.012) 
municipality 10   (0.009)            (0.557) 






Table 4: Tobit Regression Results, Original Households 
  ORIGINAL HHS SUB-SAMPLE 
                   
 [3]    [4] [5]  [6]  [7]  [8] 
                  
 male    male    male   female    female  female   
Variables 
days 
worked   
agri days 





worked   
agri days 




              
Farm Characteristics              
total hectares of land owned  -19.82111  -12.30551 -8.397016 -14.59919   96.07239  * -9.990465  
total hectares of land owned squared  0.248594  -0.63042 0.0856883 0.2545271   -41.06845  *** 0.1737162  
=1 if tenant farmer  27.02171  40.08462 -19.70275 -65.75136 *  -3.151182  -149.6082  
 = 1 if sugar producer  -19.34067  12.21576 -75.36391 -87.05434 *  -0.934605  -167.6657  
 = 1 if corn producer  16.46541  17.33262 14.22533 -87.13897   -41.02621  -137.7257  
 = 1 if rice producer  -5.201371  38.8831 -122.4225 -102.7311 *  -73.77586  *** -116.315  
          
HH & Demographic Characteristics          
no. of children aged <6 in hh  -34.08372  -39.17231** -18.63938 -52.24297    -75.28451  -13.59199  
hh size  34.28509  ** 34.67825*** 9.167009 26.76122  ** 40.86085  ** -13.0014  
ln height of hh head  -2.241976  * -1.147045* -2.953492** -1.72197  * -0.97384  -1.521624  
highest grade attained by hh head  3.327529  -1.312678 13.03587** 1.553064   -6.312734  9.032634  
age of hh head  54.78568  30.33349 40.35277 77.48875   40.34741  142.6281 ** 
age of hh head squared  -0.513081  * -0.291052 -0.403174 -0.723257   -0.430006  -1.271666 ** 
no, of prime age males in hh, aged 15-45  10.12948  17.96778 -17.85001 -50.51965 **  -65.18786  *** 10.67165  
no,  of prime age males in hh, aged 15-45  -44.92413  * -18.53119 -43.6099 25.35547   17.16267  -6.374309  
ave age of males in hh aged 15-45  5.631539  -0.3384 17.72542*** -0.911066    3.225557  -6.965323  
ave age of males in hh aged 15-45 squared  -0.048664  0.0327418 -0.290351* 0.0472972    -0.045414  0.1412227  
ave age of females in hh aged 15-45  2.292348  -6.119447** 12.7472* 0.5775481    -0.547485  5.030414  
ave age of females in hh aged 15-45 squared  -0.046369  0.1012856 -0.224995 0.0137143   0.0021655  0.0000272  
no. of males in hh aged 15-45 w/ 
secondary educ  21.27809 -9.356058 61.61928*** 0.5637574    4.785942  5.179578  
no. of males in hh aged 15-45 w/  
higher educ  -17.99717  -97.48555*** 58.31235 20.24282    -20.83372  42.12379  
no. of females in hh aged 15-45 w/  
secondary educ  -0.601461  41.0691** -92.24785* 14.94821   10.02104  63.31898  
no. of females in hh aged 15-45 w/  
higher educ  10.56401 4.873723 11.82487 80.26862  **  -17.19359  167.4544 * 
asset quintile 2  71.82901  44.71893 82.68035 -45.07884   92.00024  -201.4097  
asset quintile 3  -32.83404  -42.18918 -47.98864 10.56761   95.49756  -106.9751  
asset quintile 4  -38.26141  * -35.91478 -34.79469 -101.6847   21.68216  -215.1464  
asset quintile 5  2.623071  -31.07871 53.0058 56.75327   84.30721  -29.94898  
          
Incidents of Current Shocks          
drought 66.79087  283.6188*** -2033.719*** -1036.586  *** -703.441  *** -1161.608 * 
pest infestation before harvest  -3.218299  160.2089 -252.3652 146.6176   162.6888  110.7277  
other weather shocks  -163.4204  *** -35.91637 -334.8537 6.730351    14.95355  -46.76046  
other negative economic shocks   158.3343  252.884*** -12.95849 159.272    219.5629  * -1228.87 ** 
civil war/theft/banditry  212.9615  * 34.55568 321.9171** -33.55678    -59.67185  -1434.274 *** 
death of hh member  -80.52071  19.96498 -165.0527 -85.73303   -716.9364  *** -103.3777  
illness of hh member  -59.62592  -12.27236 -117.0922 91.50461   86.83871  17.77839  
other welfare shocks   -25.35975  93.99732 -261.2639 95.19728   137.5065  92.49267   
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Table 4: Tobit Regression Results, Original Households (continued) 
  ORIGINAL HHS SUB-SAMPLE 
                   
 [3]    [4] [5]  [6]  [7]  [8] 
                  
















          
Location dummies          
municipality 2  171.1946  194.9479 28.79114 99.81555   -588.8647  *** 123.1836  
municipality 3  163.8372  ** 175.4723** 10.06619 159.5411  * 301.0007  *** 32.29829  
municipality 4  218.6579  ** 190.3034* 87.29743 277.9649  ***  281.4449  ** 225.5737  
municipality 5  217.9571  ** 128.808 157.285 121.3408    193.9701  24.96652  
municipality 6  162.241  ** 104.1241 64.47589 111.9476    174.2539  ** 78.35246  
municipality 7  150.0371  119.1074 52.60569 314.8276   -517.555  *** 374.9556 * 
municipality 8  205.8429  166.0453 187.2443 172.6181   259.543  *** 50.25031  
municipality 9  263.7824  *** 208.6275** 189.0241 161.7504    215.8116  * 122.9466  
municipality 10  211.7704  * 77.22673 232.5624** 142.2403    142.8092  103.9557  
IMR 55.9923  -6.023233 83.84746 -104.6037    -50.95275  -159.9552  
constant -1740.541  -1025.599 -1429.545 -2085.517    -1335.173  -3809.823 ** 
/sigma 191.1432  145.6177 265.8614 192.1486    140.5771  250.6189  
                
Pseudo R2  0.0607  0.099 0.0537 0.067   0.134  0.078 
                
Obs. Summary  302  302 302 302   302  302 
Left Censored  93  146 201 194   248  242 
Uncensored 209  156 101 108    54  60 
Right Censored  0    0 0 0    0  0 
                
Note: Values are coefficent estimates; Standard errors are computed using the vce(bootstrap) option in Stata 9;  
*significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
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Table 5: Tobit Regression Results, Split Households 
  SPLIT HHS SUB-SAMPLE 
 [9]  [10]  [11]  [12]  [13]  [14] 















worked   
                    
Farm Characteristics             
total hectares of land owned  -17.30848  -1.388899   -18.61658   -94.05093   117.5295    -167.5871  
total hectares of land owned squared  -0.239963  -12.1694   0.058562   3.303701   -97.8643    6.374165  
=1 if tenant farmer  31.77026  33.9492   43.26402   89.85097   47.58179    112.2387  
 = 1 if sugar producer  -81.35553  *** -7.898916   -123.9151 *  19.7426   -32.50852    28.28387  
 = 1 if corn producer  -9.248314  8.094234   20.52249   15.39304   -0.961229    -11.99038  
 = 1 if rice producer  -34.90412  21.86657   -98.05937   109.4997 **  70.29163  **  138.595  
              
HH & Demographic Characteristics             
no. of children aged <6 in hh  -10.63246  -30.79381 *  12.32011   -21.55251   -20.9174    -10.46232  
hh size  16.03733  17.072   12.08137   -16.44697   9.996263    -39.31786  
ln height of hh head  0.6241274  -0.806545 **  2.241016 **  1.070927   0.3670267    2.2852  
highest grade attained by hh head  8.001614  -7.397453   19.79762 *  -7.019686   -1.247202    -7.277434  
age of hh head  9.002411  -15.99192   39.34874   -35.36393   -29.58638    3.03303  
age of hh head squared  -0.046854  0.2676114   -0.507331   0.4721028   0.3727485    0.121111  
no, of prime age males in hh, 15-45  51.61466  32.05512   7.526349   49.03976   37.82241    -60.53126  
no,  of prime age males in hh, 15-45  -29.99226  -19.28301   -10.87244   88.59841 **  50.14723    60.15708  
ave age of males, 15-45  11.383  4.091033   11.21012   -1.73428   -11.75184    42.10949  
ave age of males, 15-45 squared  -0.25432  -0.082209   -0.312191   0.123111   0.2657514    -0.70218  
ave age of females, 15-45  10.82038  15.25091   -2.100836   21.11985   12.16339    3.158475  
ave age of females, 15-45 squared  -0.262765  -0.305095   0.0094651   -0.219874   -0.171043    0.0299991  
no. of males in hh aged 15-45 w/ 
secondary educ  -29.05624  -12.85603   -7.513486   39.23796   0.7308174    89.76337  
no. of males in hh aged 15-45 w/  
higher educ  11.10606  18.73546   9.306721   23.28477   26.03026    -21.0345  
no. of females in hh aged 15-45 w/  
secondary educ  17.30492  -12.38006   33.56868   -43.32695 **  -43.8508  ***  6.308755  
no. of females in hh aged 15-45 w/  
higher  educ  -23.79791 -51.83961  22.65504   58.59004   -62.36213   228.7318 ** 
asset quintile 2  26.39867  23.35456   18.95168   8.178726   28.0808    46.09136  
asset quintile 3  -2.547423  30.23394   -34.20426   -18.75912   40.59257    -48.39877  
asset quintile 4  10.40508  3.879937   15.98717   -64.09776   11.08031    -93.16812  
asset quintile 5  -52.1852  11.42182   -114.5015 *  16.65661   56.00029    46.63506  
              
Incidents of Current Shocks             
drought -247.1338  -13.702   -1431.177 ***  -76.6769   -319.7074  ***  -56.31745  
pest infestation before harvest  -51.51831  -56.36781   71.27333   -455.99 ***  -495.1815    -943.948 ** 
other weather shocks  -55.93982  70.5385 ***  -1299.68 ***  115.476   107.9218    -854.0666 ** 
other negative economic shocks   -156.8174  -84.49096   -217.2187   145.8841   -44.33203    189.3385  
civil war/theft/banditry  24.65913  -555.6656 ***  103.5396 *  -718.8968 ***  -354.4337  ***  -980.0816 *** 
death of hh member  -25.72951  53.56707   -152.8156   233.5824 **  -17.79354    575.6309 ** 
illness of hh member  -37.60603  * -61.10574 **  -26.12799   -62.49477   -52.36258   -47.44997  
other welfare shocks   119.7216  ** -545.862 ***  171.3432 *  -798.5931 ***  -345.145  ***  -1267.006 ***  
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Table 5: Tobit Regression Results, Split Households (continued) 
  SPLIT HHS SUB-SAMPLE 
 [9]  [10]  [11]  [12]  [13]  [14] 















worked   
              
Location dummies             
municipality  2  38.12817  60.55739  -43.96792   -65.17653   -50.85257   -61.20828  
municipality 3  27.04538  123.967   -93.1129   -6.32767   75.68089    -84.73413  
municipality  4  38.00442  118.5623  -57.88725   -85.80656   46.4565   -300.9345  
municipality 5  39.86607  40.63795   -15.8929   -51.63455   -31.82712    -91.68916  
municipality  6  26.71459  36.59702  16.64724   -2.258088   4.070442   64.17942  
municipality 7  73.43937  128.9719   -64.86483   27.31894   -349.893  ***  76.85971  
municipality 8  78.12214  160.8914   -71.07683   80.55888   89.40991    0.4914025  
municipality  9  44.49782  105.7935  -21.19424   -70.44088   25.18866   -222.9989 * 
municipality  10  32.83503  72.14847  -48.50911   -28.14526   48.35651   -66.98906  
IMR -9.446809  -31.05987   30.43579   -22.08303   -24.6056    -22.61184  
constant  -496.8119  -12.96281  -1053.557 *  5.670059   203.3194   -1125.047  
/sigma  129.5758  93.42272  204.0346   142.7289   74.00282   222.3158  
                   
Pseudo R2  0.038  0.0803   0.039   0.0792   0.153    0.1147  
                   
Obs.  Summary  256  256  256   256   256   256  
Left  Censored  38  130  127   171   204   219  
Uncensored 218  126   129   85   52    37  
Right Censored  0    0   0   0   0    0  
                   
Note: Values are coefficent estimates; Standard errors are computed using the vce(bootstrap) option in Stata 9;  
*significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level. 
 